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Segregation Academies and State Action
After a decade of virtually complete evasion of the school desegrega-
tion decisions, integration of primary and secondary education in the
South has increased significantly. In 1965-66, 84.9 percent of black
students in the eleven Southern states attended schools which were 100
percent black. In 1972-73, the figure was only 9.2 percent.'
However, in many areas of the South efforts to eliminate segregation
in public education have been nullified by the massive withdrawal of
white children from the public schools and the concomitant establish-
ment of a "private" school system. This movement away from public
education threatens not only the achievements of fifteen years of in-
tegration efforts but also the very legitimacy of free public education
in the South. The apparent demise of metropolitan consolidation plans"-
indicates that white withdrawal to segregated private schools located
within an established school district may be the foremost issue in
school desegregation litigation.
3
This Note will examine this "segregation academy" movement and
its place in the history of Southern resistance to integration. It will
be argued that such academies may involve "state action," and that
those which exhibit certain crucial characteristics should be judicially
compelled to either desegregate or close.
I. A Brief Legal History of the Resistance
Though in retrospect, Brown v. Board of Education4 seems the al-
most inevitable culmination of a judicial trend,0 the firmness of its
1. U.S. Dep't of HEW, Press Release, Apr. 11, 1973, at 2; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, SOUTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966"67, at 7 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967
CRC REPORT].
2. See School Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., Nos. 72-549, 72-550 (U.S. May 21, 1973),
aff'g by an equally divided Court Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972).
The abstaining Justice in this Richmond, Va., decision was Justice Powell, whoimi
many expect to vote against metropolitan consolidation. Cf. Wright v. Council of tile
City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 471 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, joined by Powell, J.).
See also note 29 infra.
3. See cases cited note 35 infra.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954), implemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
5. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948); Missouri ex rel. Gaines
v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
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mandate caught supporters of segregated education without an or-
ganized response.( Thus initial reaction to Brown was cautious and
tentative;7 however, this moderation soon gave way to the fury of
Southern rebellion, led by the clarion calls of Senator Harry Byrd.8
An early form of resistance were the "interposition" resolutions-
whereby various Southern states purported to interpose their "sover-
eignty" against the Supreme Court's allegedly erroneous interpretation
of the Constitution.9 These resolutions carried an implicit threat of
racial violence-a threat which materialized in Mansfield, Texas, Clin-
ton, Tennessee, and Hoxie and Little Rock, Arkansas, as mobs of
angry whites attempted to prevent desegregation."0 In Little Rock,
federal troops were eventually needed to curtail the revolt."1 Never-
theless, the Court, in a strongly-worded, unanimous opinion quickly
ruled that threats of violence were not sufficient to slow or suspend
indefinitely school desegregation.1
2
A more subtle approach designed to maintain segregation was de-
vised by Senator Byrd and the other architects of Virginia's "massive
resistance" strategy.' 3 This approach authorized the governor to close
or cease funding integrated public schools.' 4 The federal courts, how-
6. For examples of shock and indignation during the more intense battles over in.
tegration in the South, see Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 US. 829 (1958); United States v. Wallace, 222 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Ala. 1963); Borders
v. Rippey, 184 F. Supp. 402 (N.D. Tex. 1960) (opinion of Davidson, J., on the "loyalty"
of blacks); R. COL.S, CHILD.N OF CRtSIS 281-315 (1964). See also R. CRAtN, THE PO.ITICS
OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 237-91 (1968).
7. See R. GATES, THE MAKING OF MASSIvE RESISTANCE 28-41 (1962); A. Iwzs & THE
NEie YORK TIms, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE 32-33 (1964); R. McGiLL, THw SoUm AND mI E
SourmaERR 246-47 (1964); B. MusE, TEN YEARS OF PRELUDE 16-29 (1964).
8. See 102 CONG. Rc. 3948, 4004 (1956); R. GATEs, supra note 7, at 13-17, 117-19; R.
McGiLL, supra note 7, at 253; Southern School News, April 1956, at 1, col. 1.
9. Interposition xesolutions were passed in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi,
Tennessee, and Virginia. 2 T. EmrasoN, D. HADER & N. DoRsEN, PoITrrICAL AND CIvIL
RIcTs IN THE UNITED STATES 1645 (3d ed. 1967). Arkansas interposed by initiative. 1
RACE REL. L. REP. 591, 1116 (1956).
These resolutions were held invalid. See Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 188 F.
Supp. 916, 922-26 (E.D. La. 1960), afJ'd mer., 365 U.S. 569 (1961).
10. A. Lawis & THE NEw YORK Ti.tns, supra note 7, at 46.69. B. Msua, supra note
7, at 87-104, 122-45. See also Southern News, Oct. 1954, at 9, col. 2; id., Jan. 1936, at 9,
col. 1; id., Mar. 1956, at 6, col. 1; id., Sept. 1956, at 3, col. 1, id., Oct 1956, at 15, col.
1; id., Oct. 1957, at 1, col. 1.
11. See Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 389 (1957); B. MuSE, Supra note 7, at 122.45;
Southern School News, Oct. 1957, at 1, col 1.
12. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
13. See generally R. GATEs, supra note 7; B. MusE, ViRGL N4's MASSIVE RESISTA.cE (1961).
14. See 2 T. E.MRso.N, D. HABER & N. DoasE., supra note 9, at 1652-54. These laws
were generally coupled with companion legislation repealing compulsory school at-
tendance. Several states enacted so-called "Little Rock" laws which called for the dosing
of schools which were patrolled by federal troops. Id. See generally B. Smsmt, THEY CLOSED
THEIR SCHOOLS (1965); Note, School Closing Plans, 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 807 (1958).
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ever, again struck down such laws, ordering that the schools be re-
opened and be supported by public funds.la
But the school closing decisions did not completely destroy the sur-
rogate system of private schools that had developed from, nor the con-
cept of "private" segregation inherent in, the school closing strategy, 10
and such schools continued to be important as part of the widely emu-
lated1 7 plan of the Gray Commission of Virginia.18 Although the plan
of the Commission was formulated in 1955, only a year after Brown,
its implementation was delayed until massive resistance had failed. At
that point its more moderate approach became the heart of the re-
sistance effort. Its two-pronged program involved "pupil assignment"
laws19 and massive financial aid to private segregated schools.
20
The federal courts at first refused to overturn pupil assignment laws,
holding that they were permissible during the early stages of deseg-
regation. 21 However, the courts soon grew suspicious of the lack of
15. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hall v. St. Helena Parish
School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), afj'd mem., 368 U.S. 515 (1962); R. SaRRATr,
THE ORDEAL OF DESEGREGATION 312-18 (1966).
16. The most infamous examples of private school systems arising when public schools
were closed are the incidents in Little Rock, Arkansas, and Prince Edward County,
Virginia. See generally B. MusE, supra note 7, at 152-56, 187-97.
In enacting school closing laws, the Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and Louisiana legis.
latures added companion legislation authorizing the lease or sale of public education
facilities. 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 9, at 1660. Other acts per-
mitted diversion of public funds to private schools, see, e.g., Nos. 4, 5, [1958] Ark. Acts
2d Extra Sess.; cf. chs. 191, 448, [1960] Va. Laws, 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 521 (1960) (scholar-
ships and tax credits), and the inclusion of private school teachers in ptublic school re-
tirement programs, see, e.g., No. 15, [1956] Ga. Acts, 1 RACE REL. L. RES. 424 (1956).
Ultimately, neither school closings nor formal state legislation of benefits was neces-
sary to the operation of private schools. In Prince Edward County, for example, tuition
grants and tax credits were invalidated, Allen v. County School Bd., 198 F. Supp. 497
(E.D. Va. 1961), and public schools were ordered reopened, Griffin v. County School Bd.,
377 U.S. 218 (1964). Nevertheless, in 1970 the Prince Edward County School Foundation
continued to enroll virtually all of the white students in the county. RACE RELATIONS
INFORMATION CENTER, MAJORITY BLACK SCHOOL Disnuars 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
MAJORITY BLACK SCHOOL DISTRICTS].
17. See notes 21-34 infra.
18. The Report of this commission which was formally called the Commission on
Public Education, is reprinted in 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 241 (1955). See generally R. GATES,
supra note 7, at 62-72.
19. See 1 RACE REL. L. REP'. 242-43 (1956). Under the typical pupil assignment law,
a black pupil who wished to be transferred from his segregated school would apply to
the local school board or a state pupil assignment board. The request was to be deter-
mined on the basis of factors such as health and aptitude of the child or availability of
transportation. These laws, in thus placing the burden of desegregation on the black
child, denied the existence of an affirmative duty to desegregate. By forcing individual
blacks to resort to lengthy "administrative remedies" before bringing actions in federal
court, see Covington v. Edwards, 165 F. Supp. 957 (M.D.N.C. 1958), a]f'd, 264 F.2d 780
(4th Cir. 1959), the laws also made class actions against school boards practically |m-
possible. See McCoy v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 179 F. Supp. 745 (M.D.N.C.), rev'd,
283 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1960).
20. See notes 30-33 infra.
21. See, e.g., Carson v. Warlick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956); Shuttlesworth v. Birming-
ham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372 (N.D. Ala.), aJJ'd mem., 358 U.S. 101 (1958). But see
School Bd. v. Atkins, 246 F2d 325 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957).
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actual integration under such laws and began to hold that they were
being applied unfairly to suspend desegregation.2 2 Southern school
boards then turned, sometimes with the help of legislation,'2 3 to so-
called "freedom of choice" plans in which the discretion of parents
and unofficial coercion were substituted for the artificial criteria of
the pupil placement boards.
24
However, again the obvious effect of such plans was to perpetuate
a dual system of schools: one black, the other white, save for a few
courageous and ambitious blacks.2 To counter this effect, the Court
in Green v. New Kent County School Board20 held that each board
had an affirmative duty to desegregate its schools and that every dis-
trict had to convert to a unitary school system. Green and its progeny,
Alexander-27 and Swann,28 have had a revolutionary effect on school
desegregation in the South by requiring immediate implementation
of unitary plans in districts formerly proceeding at a snail's pace. These
decisions thus leave no escape route from full desegregation within
the geographic limits of a public school system.20
22. See, e.g., Brown v. School Dist. No. 20, 328 F.2d 618 (4th Cir. 196M); Evers v.
Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 328 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1964). The only precise
Supreme Court ruling on pupil assignment was that school boards could not give
those in a racial minority in a particular school a right to tramnsfer out of that school.
Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683 (1963).
23. See, e.g., No. 117, [1956] Ala. Acts, 1 FLkcE REL. L. REP. 717 (1956); ch. 11,
[1957] Tenn. Laws, 2 RACE R.. L. RxP. 215 (1957); Law of May 23, 1957, [1957] Texas
Laws, 2 RACE RtL. L. REP. 693 (1957).
24. See 1967 CRC PEPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46. Under such a plan the school board
-was supposed to approve all the requests for transfers. By placing the burden of de-
segregation on black children this plan achieved the same result as pupil assignment
laws, while avoiding the allegation that applications were being denied on the basis of
race. Thus the issue obscured in the pupil assignment litigation emerged full blown:
Does the Constitution require affirmative desegregation or does it only forbid forced
segregation? See Coppedge v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 273 F. Supp. 289 (E.D.N.C.
1967). Cf. Weinstein, The Negro Family's Decision to Desegregate, Southern School News,
Nov. 1960, at 1, col. 2.
25. See 1967 CRC REPORT 45-69, 88.
26. 391 U.S. 430 (1968), rev'g 382 F.2d 338 (4th Cir. 1967). Only the Fourth Circuit
had clearly ruled favorably on freedom of choice plans, in Green and in a companion case,
Bowman v. County School Bd., 582 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1967). The Fifth and Eighth Cir-
cuits were less willing to approve freedom of choice plans, adding a number of safe-
guards to school board plans and expressing skepticism about the efficacy of freedom
of choice as a means of achieving desegregation. See United States .,. Jefferson County
Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), afJ'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied sub nor. Caddo Parish School Bd. v. Unitcd States, 389 U.S. 840 (1967);
Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14-(8th Cir. 1965), on subsequent appeal, 389 F.2d 178 (8th
Cir. 1968). See generally Note, Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Equal Protection, 82 HAnv.
L. REv. 111 (1968).
27. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
28. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
29. The foremost residual problem in the post-Green era is whether the concept of
affirmative duty requires the modification of school district boundaries to maximize in-
tegration. Last term, the Court dealt with the negative side of this question by holding
that it is impermissible to carve out new school districts if the effect is to impede
desegregation in the existing district by shrinking the pool of available white students.
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The other arm of the Gray Commission program was aid for private
segregated schools. One type of aid, the transfer of facilities from
closed public schools, 30 was ended with the demise of the closing
plans.31 The other form of direct state assistance, tuition grants, 32 was
held unconstitutional first in connection with the school closing liti-
gation, on the theory that they were part of an overall plan to avoid
Brown,33 and later as a violation of a state's affirmative duty to de-
segregate.3 4 As other forms of both overt and covert state or local as-
sistance to segregated private schools have emerged, federal courts have
gone about the business of ending such aid under the same principle
that it violates the affirmative duty to desegregate.3 5 But despite such
decisions, segregated private schools remain a significant threat to the
existence of an effective system of desegregated public education in
much of the South.
Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v. Scotland
Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972). The affirmative aspect of this problem, i.e.,
the duty to equalize racial balance through consolidation of contiguous school systems,
has apparently been resolved against the duty to consolidate. See School Bd. v. State
Bd. of Educ., Nos. 72-549, 72-550 (U.S. May 21, 1973), ajj'g by an equally divided Court
Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), rev'g 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972):
note 2 supra. The issue will be definitely resolved when the Court hears the Detroit
case. Bradley v. Milliken, 339 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1972), aJJ'd, Nos. 72-1809, 72.
1814 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 1972), vacated and rehearing en bane ordered, Nos. 72.1809,
72-1814 (6th Cir. Jan. 18, 1973), aff'd on rehearing, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1973, at 1, col 1.
30. See 1 RAcE Rr..L. REP. 243-44 (1956).
31. See p. 1438 supra.
32. Tuition grant legislation was enacted in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia. See 2 T. EMERsoN, D. HADER & N. DORSEN,
supra note 9, at 1659-60; 1967 CRC REPORT 72 n.314. See generally R. GATES, supra
note 7, at 67-69; King, Rebuilding the Fallen House-State Tuition Grants for Ele.
mentary and Secondary Education, 84 HAnv. L. REv. 1057 (1971).
33. See, e.g., Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964);
Pettaway v. Surry County School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va.), aff'd sub nora.
Griffin v. County Bd. of Supervisors, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1964). Cf. Hall v. St.
Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), a!l'd mem., 368 U.S. 515
(1962); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark.), aHf'd mer. sub nor. Faubus
v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959).
34. See, e.g., Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969)
(tuition grants); Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, Civil No. 3906 (S.D. Miss. Sept.
2, 1970) (tuition loans); Griffin v. State Bd. of Educ., 296 F. Supp. 1178 (E.D. Va. 1969);
Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967),
aff'd mem., 389 U.S. 571 (1968); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458
(M.D. Ala.), aird mem. sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967).
35. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973) (use of
public facilities); Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972)
(lease of school building); Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 915 (1971) (sale of school building); United States v. Tunica County
School Dist., 323 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 440 F2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971)
(salary payments to private school teachers). Cf. United States v. Mississippi, No. 72-
2521 (5th Cir. April 11, 1973); McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 460 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir. 1972) (transfers of public school buildings to private schools permitted if those
schools have an open enrollment policy). But cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp.
1003 (N.D. Miss. 1972), prob. furis. noted, 409 U.S. 839 (1972) (textbook loans).
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II. Growth and Trends in the Segregation Academy Movement
A. A Statistical Overview
A small number of private segregated schools were established prior
to 1966 to accommodate the moderate numbers of white children who
withdrew from the public schools 0 because of the token integration
achieved under voluntary transfer plans.37 Real growth of the "seg-
regation academy" movement,38 however, began when unitary school
systems became required under Green's affirmative duty to desegre-
gate.39 In the post-Green era many white parents who had previously
allowed their children to attend public schools with a small number
of blacks refused to enroll their children in genuinely integrated
schools. The result was a massive white withdrawal from the public
schools and a flurry of activity in organizing and expanding private
ones.40 While direct and indirect state assistance to such schools"l
was significant in facilitating their formation and maintenance, the
central reason for their growth was not the availability of state sup-
port but rather the determination of white parents to avoid desegre-
gation at any cost.
42
The estimated enrollment in Southern private schools organized or
expanded in response to desegregation increased from roughly 25,000
in 196643 to approximately 535,000 by 1972.44 While state-wide statis-
36. See Leeson, Private Schools for Whites Face Some Hurdles, SoUtrnN EnuC. REP.,
Nov. 1967, at 13-17; Leeson, Private Schools Continue to Increase in the South, Sotrmltn
Eouc. REP., Nov. 1966, at 22-25; Hearings on Equal Educational Opportunity Before
the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sem., pt. SC,
at 1502 (1970) (testimony of Melvyn Leventhal, NAACP Legal Defense Fund) [here-
inafter cited as Mondale Hearings].
37. See pp. 1458-39 supra.
38. The term "segregation academy" will be used here to denote one of "a System
of private schools operated on a racially segregated basis as an alternative aailable to
white students seeking to avoid desegregated public schools." Coffey v. State Educ. Fin.
Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (S.D. Miss. 1969).
39. See pp. 1438-39 supra.
40. The recent growth of segregation academies is chronicled in a series of studies
prepared for the Southern Regional Council by Katherine Griffith Terjen. See Griffith,
New "Segregation Academies" are Flourishing in the South, SoUtH ToDAY, Oct. 1969,
reprinted in Mondale Hearings, supra note 36, pt. 3D. at 1951-58 [hereinafter cited
as 1969 SRC Report, with pagination to Mondale Hearings]; Terjen, The Segregation
Academy Movement, in THE SOUTH AND HR CmiitzrE: ScHOOL DE SREcG.,Tio. 1970-71,
at 69 (Southern Regional Council, 1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 SRC Report]; Terjen.
Close-up on Segregation Academies, NEw SouTH, Fall 1972, at 50 [hereinafter cited
as 1972 SRC Report].
41. See p. 1440 supra.
42. See R. Fitrs, THE STATUs OF PRIVATE SEGREGATED SCHooLS IN ELEvE SournEwn
STATES 3-87. and Statistical Appendix (NAACP Legal Defense Fund 1972) [hereinafter
cited as LDF REPORT].
43. The figure in the text was computed from data in 1967 CRC Rrx'or, supra
note 1, at 71.
44. 1972 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 50; for enrollments in intermediate )ears. se
1971 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 69; 1969 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 1951-53.
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tics are available," they do not fully show actual impact, as private
school enrollment is typically concentrated in those areas where the
public schools contain a majority of black children.40 Thus, although
Southern private school enrollment remains below the national aver-
45. The number of private schools and students in Southern states where such in-
formation is available is as follows:
1967-68 1968-69 1969-70 1970.71 1971-72 1972-73
Ala. 24,513, 26,288 35,846 47,098 49,546 57,178
l9lb 186 295 301 302 305
Ga.0 N/A N/A 34,105 50,078 68.160 73.414
151 224 269 284
La. 143,013 d  135,750 154,930 161,711 152.259 N/A
416 398 421 456 453
Miss.* 20,593 21,951 42,865 61,530 62,388 62,836
1660 166 252 330 305 303
N. Car. 18,300' 21,802 27,471 36,820 49,016 51,298
N/A 174 201 231 257 263
S. Car. 24,593 26,887 26,009 38,762 40,722 N/A
110 116 123 164 167
Tenn.* 35,500 35,691 35,046 34,947 42,600 46,0000
108 124 101 91 178 1800
Va.0 N/A 69,118 72,843 71,861 75,009 N/A
322 333 348 375
0 Voluntary Reporting Only
a Enrollment in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools
b Number of nonpublic schools reported by State Department of Education
c Estimated
d In Louisiana a majority of nonpublic school students attend Roman Catholic paro-
chial schools. Within the total enrollment shown Catholic schools declined from 121,509
in 1967-68 to 112,667 in 1971-72, while non-Catholic schools increased from 21,504 to
39,592. Private Schools, SCHOOLS IN TRANSITION, Aug. 1972, at 1.
e Mississippi reports the number of elementary and secondary schools separately, thus
an academy with twelve grades counts as two schools.
Sources: Responses to questionnaires sent to state educational agencies, plus (1)
Louisiana: Private Schools, SCHOOLS IN TRANSITION, Aug. 1972, at 1; (2) North Carolina:
Charlotte News & Observer (N.C.), Sept. 25, 1971, clipping on file with the Yale Law
journal.
The questionnaire responses indicate that the enrollment statistics include some long.
established nonsegregated private schools, see p. 1444 infra, as well as a very smial
number of all black private schools, e.g., three of 200 in Mississippi in 1972-73.
There is reason to suspect that the figures given are understated. Even in Alabama,
where reporting is required by state law, 35 of 65 members of the Alabama Private
School Association, see note 70 infra, failed to report their 1971 enrollments to the
State Board of Education. LDF REPORT, supra note 42, at 4. Florida, Texas, and
Arkansas do not officially record private school enrollment. It appears, however, that
the segregation academy movement is active both in Florida, see LDF REPORT 10-12:
Record at I App. 24-46, School Bd. v. Department of HEW, No. 72-3215 (5th Cir. Mar. 21,
1973) (decision of HEW hearing examiner), and in at least part of Arkansas, see LDF
REPORT 8-10.
The United States Office of Education, which, as do some states, depends on voluntary
reporting, recorded a nonsectarian private school enrollment increase of 242.2 percent
in the twelve-state southeast region between 1961-62 and 1970-71. During the same
period, enrollment in private schools affiliated with religious denominations other than
Roman Catholic increased 167.7 percent. 1972 SRC Report, sutra note 40, at 50-51, By
contrast, the Department of Commerce reported that nationwide private school enroll.
ment decreased 23 percent from 1965-1971. U.S. DEs'T OF CO.%MERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORT: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS Ser. P-20, No. 234 (1972).
46. See pp. 1450-52 infra.
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age47 and there is evidence that the white exodus from the public
schools may have recently stabilized,48 the actual impact of the segre-
gation academy movement in areas with a large black population is
still enormous.49 It is in these areas that the force of the segregation
academies must be measured and their impact on public education
gauged.
B. Establishment and Operation of Segregated Private Schools
1. Parochial Schools
The few children enrolled in Southern Roman Catholic schools °
are predominantly white. This de facto segregation in parochial schools
is, however, due primarily to the fact that very few Southern Catholics
are black.51 Since the early 1960's, the policy of the Catholic Church
has proscribed racial segregation in its schools,52 but only recently has
the Church taken affirmative actions to dismantle previously existing
dual school systems53 and to avoid serving as a haven for segregationist
non-Catholics."
47. See 1972 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 50; Mondale Hearings, supra note 40. at
pt. SC, at 1904-09 (statement of Senator McClellan). This is primarily the result of
the relatively small Roman Catholic population in the South. See note 50 infra.
48. In Hinds County, Mississippi (encompassing Jackson), private school enrollment
declined slightly in 1972 after substantial increases in ea year since 19GS. Egerton,
Report Card on Southern School Desegregation, S.TTRD.ALY REvIEw, April 1, 1972, at 41-42;
Clarion-Ledger Uackson, Miss.), Oct. 24, 1972, at 1, col. 1. Similarly, in Greenville,
Mississippi, white withdrawals stabilized at forty percent of the total white student
population in 1972-73 after alarming losses. See Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Miss.),
Sept. 17, 1972, at 3, col. 1. However, stabilization short of virtually complete white
withdrawal from the public schools is less common in heavily black districts. See pp.
1450-52 infra.
49. See pp. 1450-52 infra.
50. As of 1968-69, 3.8 percent of southern school-age children attended Catholic
schools as compared with a 9.7 percent national average. Computed from D. GEntTLES
& L. BARKER, STATISTICS OF PUBLIC AND NoNruBuc Et-LEENTrAY AND SECONDAnY DAY
SCHOOLS 1968-69, at 21, 48-51 (Department of HEW 1969).
51. Black Catholics comprise the following percentages of all Catholics in various
dioceses in the South: Savannah-10 percent, Atlanta-7 percent, Nashville-3.7 percent,
Little Rock-3.4 percent, Richmond-1.9 percent. In southern Louisiana and Mobile, how-
ever, over 20 percent of Catholics are black, O'Neil, How Catholic?, Sotrn Too.&Y, Oct.
1970, at 4-5.
52. See D. ERICKSON & J. DoNovA^, THE THRE R's or No. runuc EDCATIo. ifN
LOUISIANA: RACE, REGION, AND RELIGION 53-175 (1972); D. LnBmE, JIM Ctow CoMiEs
TO CHURCH (1971); Guillory, Parochial Schools, SOUTH TODAY, Dec. 1971, at 4.
53. IV. BRODERICK, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND BLACK AtERtc..s IN 1970, at 11-25 (U.S.
Department of State Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy 1970); D. ERIcKSON & J. DONOVAN,
supra note 52; at 81-90, 278-84; Guillory, supra note 52. Cf. R. CPRAN, supra note 7, at
235-822. See also US. Co?.ti'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN TIlE PUiLIC S .HOOLS
38-59 (1967); Note, The Wall of Racial Isolation: The Role of Private and Parochial
Schools in Racial Isolation, 43 N.Y.U.L. REv. 514 (1968).
In Louisiana black Catholic children have sought desegregation of parochial schools
on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Complaint at 14-16, Greenhouse v.
Greco, Civil No. 17,741-A (W.D. La., filed Apr. 3, 1972).
54. In 1971 the Diocese of Nashville announced its intent to limit the percentage of
non-Catholic whites in its schools. Chattanooga Times, June 6, 1971, clipping on file
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2. Elite Prep Schools
Most pre-desegregation, high-quality, Southern prep schools have
studiously avoided association with the segregation academy move-
ment. The Mid-South Association of Independent Schools, to which
most of these schools belong, has refused to admit segregation acade-
mies.55 Moreover, many of the members of the Association have en-
rolled and even recruited minority students, often providing them with
substantial financial assistance."0 Nevertheless, the non-white enroll-
ment in such schools will probably remain relatively insignificant
given the generally prohibitive tuition charges.
3. True Segregation Academies
The true "segregation academy" is a product of the post-Green era.57
These schools were at first operated with tuition grants from state
with the Yale Law journal. Similar actions have been taken in some areas of southern
Louisiana, D. ERICKSON & J. DONOVAN, supra note 52, at 274-78, and in Richmond,
Virginia, see Bumpy Road in Richmond, TiMm, Feb. 28, 1972, at 15.
55. Chattanooga Times, March 30, 1971, at 1, col. 1. The Georgia Association of In-
dependent Schools has expelled member schools which maintain any ties with segre-
gationist school associations. LDF REPORT, supra note 42, at 16.
56. See, e.g., Mondale Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 3D, at 1986-90 (testimony of Dr.
William B. Pressly, President of Westminster School, Atlanta, Ga.); Letter from Sally
Evans, of Trinity School, Atlanta, Georgia, to authors, Mar. 24, 1972, on file with the
Yale Law Journal.
57. See pp. 1441-42 supra. One may speak of three classes of segregation academy,
roughly corresponding to the social and economic divisions within the white community:
(a) lower-class, "rebel yell" academies; (b) white community schools; and (c) upper-
class day schools.
Poor white families have organized irregular "'rebel yell" academies which provide
only rudimentary education. These "schools" consist of small groups of children cared
for by mothers or individuals without professional educational training. Few have a
permanent physical plant, and are typically conducted in private homes, churches, or
abandoned commercial buildings. See Mondale Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 3D, at 1951,
1965; Brown, Academies: Many Parents Would Give Children Bad Educations, SOUTII
TODAY, Dec. 1970, at 12; Tornquist, Rebel Yell Academies, RAMPARTS, Sept. 1971, at
12. These academies have caused alarm among some state educational authorities, who
fear that thousands of white children are receiving a grossly inadequate education and
will become unemployable dropouts at an early age. GEORGIA STATE SENATE PRIVATE
SCHOOL STUDY COMM., REPORT 1-3 (1971).
By contrast, a small number of post-desegregation schools, located primarily in urban
centers, offer complete academic programs, competent staffs recruited largely from the
public school system, accreditation by state and regional authorities, modern physical
plants, and amenities such as guidance counseling, language and science laboratories,
and airconditioning. These "segregation academies, second generation," aspire to the
same elite status as traditional upper-class day schools in the rest of the nation. Most
have announced "open enrollment" policies as required by the Internal Revenue Service,
see note 62 infra, but in practice their student bodies contain neither blacks nor low-
income whites. Terjen, Private Schools, Charleston Style, Sourn TODAY, Jan.-Feb, 1971,
at 7. Examples include Jackson (Miss.) Prep., see Egerton, supra note 48, at 42; Mont-
gomery (Ala.) Academy, see Brief for Montgomery Academy as Amicus Curiae, at 11-17,
Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973); and Washington (County,
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governments.58 However, the judicial invalidation of that means of
support has caused them to charge significant tuition fees, often pro-
ducing financial hardship for lower- and middle-class families50 and
thereby forcing reductions in local school taxes.00 The hardship would
have been even greater were it not for the fact that the academies
Miss.) Day School, see Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Miss.), May 13. 1971, at 9, col. 3.
Between these extremes are the middle-class white community schools. Although most
profess to have academically-selective admissions policies, in practice no white child is
refused admission solely on academic grounds. On the other hand. despite the fact
that some have announced nondiscriminatory enrollment policies, there is no reported
case of a black child having been admitted to a post-desegregation community academy.
Tuition at white community schools ranges from $200 to $700 per )ear. with discounts
for multiple enrollments from one family. 1972 SRC Report, supra note 40. at 56;
Instant Schools, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 26, 1970, at 59; Commercial Appeal (Memphis. Tenn.),
Nov. 28, 1970, at 9, col. 1. Tuition may be waived in the case of poor families whose
children would otherwise be forced to attend desegregated public schools. Instant Schools,
supra. See generally J. Buie, An Investigation and Analysis of Selected Characteristics
of Students Who Withdrew from Goldsboro City Schools Sy)stem to Attend Independent
Schools, Nov. 22, 1971 (unpublished dissertation, Duke University); A. Cleseland, Ala-
bama's Private Non-Sectarian Elementary and Secondary Schools in 1970, Dec. 9, 1970,
at 51-87 (unpublished dissertation, Auburn University).
58. In Louisiana, more than $15 million was distributed to children attending pri-
vate schools. Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 85-59
(E.D. La. 1967). Mississippi distributed over $3.2 million. Affidavit of Armand Derfner,
Coffey v. State Educ. Fin. Comm'n, Civil No. 3906 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 2, 1970). Virginia
distributed more than $10 million. Pettaway v. School Bd., 230 F. Supp. 480, 484 (E.D.
Va.), affd, 339 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1954).
The federal courts found that the grants were vitally important in the founding and
support of many segregation academies. See, e.g., Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance
Comm'n, supra, at 845-48; Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389,
1392-95 (S.D. -Miss. 1969).
59. 1972 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 56-57; 'Myles, Pritvate Schools: Enrollments
Almost Triple in Tar Heel State, SouTH ToD.Y, Dec. 1971, at 5. See Mondale Hearings,
supra note 40, pt. 3A, at 1198; id., pt. 3D, at 1977. Merchants in towns where segre-
gation academies are active report declines in sales of clothing, appliances and auto-
mobiles. Id., pt. 3D, at 1947-50. Banks report increased personal borrowing to pay pri-
vate school tuition, and in many families either the husband or wife has taken another
job. Brown & Provizer, The South's New Dual School System: A Case Study, NEW Sour,
Fall 1972, at 62. See also Biossat, Bluff on Integration Sputtering Out, Naples Daily
News (Fla.), Dec. 22, 1970, clipping on file with the Yale Law Journal. These effects
have occurred despite the fact that the tuition charged by many segregation academies
is only about $360 per annum, well less than one-half of the tuition charged by repu-
table college preparatory schools and considerably less than the amount spent per
pupil in the public schools. 1972 SRC Report 56-57. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 57, at 62.
60. Representative school tax reductions have occurred in Sumter County, Georgia,
where the mill rate was cut from 20 to 12 between 1970 and 1972, Brown & Provizer,
supra note 59, at 64-65; Western Line School District, ,Mississippi, which reduced its
school assessment from 27 to 23.5 mills immediately after 500 white children left public
schools for segregation academies, Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Miss.). Jan. 12,
1971, at 7, col. 1; and Calhoun District No. 2, South Carolina, which received special
authority from the state legislature to reduce school taxes from 35 to 25 mills and
to refund previously collected taxes, MAjoitrrY BLACK Scitooz Dsrmtrs, supra note 16,
at 38.
School tax reductions have been disproportionate to the marginal savings caused by
reduced enrollment; the cuts have therefore adversely affected the operation of public
school systems. For example, Sumter County, after reducing its mill rate, ran out of
funds and had to borrow one-fourth of its total 1971-72 teacher salary costs, Brown
Provizer, supra note 59, at 65. See generally Buie, supra note 57, at 127-35.
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have benefited from state6' and federal 2 tax exemptions; the gift,
lease, or purchase of public school property; 3 free transportation and
61. Virtually all Southern states exempt private schools from state income taxes,
property taxes, and corporate or association taxes. Some also exempt them from sales
taxes. See Questionnaires from Southern state governments, on file with the Yale Law
Journal. Louisiana has recently enacted a law which would provide for a state income
tax credit of up to $50 for tuition paid to nonpublic schools. LA. REV. Srxvr. §.§ 47:85-89
(West Supp. 1972). Similar tax credits were invalidated in Allen v. County School Bd.,
198 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Va. 1961). But cf. Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance
Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 854 (E.D. La. 1967) (dicta).
62. The Internal Revenue Code provides that the income of charitable organizations
shall be exempt from taxation, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3), and that contrI.
butions to such organizations shall be deductible from the donor's net income, id.
§ 170(c)(2). In 1970 black plaintiffs successfully challenged IRS approval of charitable
exemptions for segregation academies in Mississippi on the ground that such excip.
tions were violative of the statutory objectives of the Code. Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub norm. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). See 50
TEXAs L. REV. 544 (1972).
As a result of Green, the IRS has allowed tax.exempt status only to those private
schools which have "racially nondiscriminatory admissions policies." IRS News Release,
July 10, 1970, 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6790, at 71,633; IRS News Release,
July 16, 1970, 7 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 6814, at 71,665.
Hundreds of racially segregated academies, however, have received favorable rulings on
the basis of their own affidavits that they have an open enrollment policy. See Mondale
Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 3C, at 1714-16, 1826-28; id., pt. 3D, at 1992.2198; 1972 SRC
Report, supra note 40, at 51-55; 1971 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 72-79. By September
1972 only forty-one segregated private schools had had their tax exempt status revoked.
Sixty-three other segregated private schools face revocation of their tax exempt status.
LDF REPORT, supra note 42, at 38-40; Letter from Johnnie M. Walters, Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, to Melvyn Leventhal, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Jan. 9, 1973,
on file with the Yale Law Journal; cf. Crenshaw County Private School Foundation v.
Connally, No. 72-2775 (5th Cir. March 14, 1973).
63. See Wright v. City of Brighton, 441 F.2d 447, 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 915 (1971).
Examples of the transfer of school buildings and related equipment which have
come to the attention of Congress, the federal courts, or the Department of Justice,
include:
Alabama: Jefferson County (sale of school building for $12,500), Wright v. City of
Brighton, supra, at 449.
Georgia: Baker and Sumter Counties (sale of school building and equipment at bar-
gain-basement prices, e.g., a $125,000 school for $6,500), Complaint at 5.7, Wright v.
Baker County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 1167 (M.D. Ga., filed March 13, 1972); Complaint
at 3-4, Nelson v. Sumter County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 730 (M.D. Ga., filed April 22,
1971). Greene County (sale of $24,000 school for $100), Mondale Hearings, supra note
40, pt. 3D, at 2018, 2120. Walton County (lease agreement under which the board per.
mits a private academy to use a new $289,000 public school in exchange for the use
of a former public school previously sold by the board for $17,000), Brief for Ap-
pellants at 5-6, Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., '165 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972).
Louisiana: Coushatta Parish (sale of school building with equipment for $501.50),
Mondale Hearings, pt. 3B, at 1504 (question by Senator Mondale). Madison Parlsh
(rental of public high school stadium and transfer of equipment to private academy),
Id. at 1498 (testimony of George Strickler, Lawyers' Constitutional Defense Committee).
St. Landry Parish (lease of public school building and equipment for $500 per year,
lease reprinted, id., pt. 3A, at 1147-49.
Mississippi: Amite County (donation of complete set of school equipment to private
academy), Mondale Hearings, pt. 3B, at 1495. Smith County (private academy leased for-
mer public school for $5 per year), Brief for United States at 5. United States v.
Mississippi, No. 72-2521 (5th Cir. Apr. 11, 1975). Tate County (sale of old school build.
ing to segregated academies), McNeal v. Tate County School Dist.. 460 F.2d 568 (5th
Cir. 1972). Leake County (bargain sale of school building), Mondale Hearings, pt. 3B,
at 1503.
Threatened transfers of school buildings by other Mississippi school districts have
been enjoined. See, e.g., Taylor v. Coahoma County School Dist., 345 F. Supp. 891 (N.D.
Miss. 1972).
North Carolina: Anson County (transfer of school building to academy through In-
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state-owned textbooks; 4 the use of public facilities;63 assistance from
public officials; 0 and support from centers of local economic power. 7
Many academies, denominating themselves "Christian Academies," are
also affiliated with Protestant churches, thus obtaining the use of
church buildings and additional tax-exempt revenue.08
termediary sale to volunteer fire department), Charlotte Observer, April 8. 1971, clipping
on file with the Yale Law Journal.
South Carolina: Cherokee County (lease of $60,000 school building for $700 per month),
lease reprinted, Mondale Hearings, pt. 3D, at 2106.
Tennessee: Fayette County (public school buildings sold or leased with school equip-
ment included), Motion for Additional Relief at 9, McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ.,
Civil No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn., filed Aug. 31, 1971).
64. Louisiana and Mississippi supply free textbooks to private school students. LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. S§ 17:351, 17:352 (1963); Miss. CODE ANN. § 6658 (1952). Louisiana also
supplies bus transportation, health services, and free lunches to nonpublic school
students. STAFF OF PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON SCHOOL FINANCE, PUBLIC AID To NoNrtuLIc
EDucATioN 40 (1971). A suit challenging state provision of textbooks and other forms
of aid to segregated private schools in Louisiana is pending in federal court. Brum-
field v. Dodd, Civil No. 71-1316 (E.D. La., filed May 11, 1971). The Louisiana textbook
law has been upheld against First Amendment challenges. Cochran v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
The Mississippi free textbook law has recently been upheld by a federal court
as applied to segregation academies. Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D.
Miss.), prob. juris. noted, 409 U.S. 839 (1972). The evidence in Norwood indicates that
34,000 students in 107 all-white private schools founded since 1954 were receiving state
texts. 340 F. Supp. at 1011. To facilitate the establishment of new academies, the
Mississippi state textbook board allowed all public school children to take their texts
with them when they transferred to. private school. See 43 Miss. L.J. 737 n.1 (1972).City *t Cr. 19)
65. See, e.g., Alabama: Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973)
(athletic facilities).
Georgia: Complaint at 5-6, Wright v. Baker County Bd. of Educ., Civil No. 1167
(M.D. Ga., filed Mar. 13, 1972) (cafeteria facilities).
Louisiana: Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1.2, Lemon v. Bossier Parish
School Bd., Civil No. 10,687 (W.D. La., filed Sept. 25, 1970) (athletic field).
Mississippi: Complaint at 3, Gooden v. Mississippi State Univ., Cisil No. EC-72-12-K
(N.D. Miss., filed Feb. 14, 1972) (proposed use of state university field house).
North Carolina: Myles, supra note 57, at 5 (city library used as academy library).
Tennessee: Motion for Additional Relief at 9, McFerren v. Count), Bd. of Educ.,
Civil No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn., filed Aug. 31, 1971) (use of public athletic facilities).
66. Some state and local political leaders have used their public offices to facilitate
the establishment of segregation academies through endorsements, fund-raising cam.
paigns, and favorable administrative actions. Notable examples have been Alabama
Governor Wallace, see Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D.
Ala.), aird mem. sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967); Walden &
Cleveland, The South's New Segregation Academies, Pit DELTA KAPPA.v, Dec. 1971,
at 234, 238-39; former Governor Lester Maddox of Georgia, see Mondale Hearings, supra
note 40, pt. 3D, at 1934-35, 1965; and Mississippi Senator James Eastland and State
Supreme Court Justice Tom Brady, id. at 2198-2200. See Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin.
Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 849-50 (E.D. La. 1967), afrd mere., 389 U.S. 571
(1968).
67. Businessmen have acquiesced in "assessments," similar in amount to public school
taxes, levied and collected by segregation academies under threat of white boycott,
MAJORITY BLACK SCHOOL Disriucrs, supra note 16, at 26; B. S.mrT, supra note 14, at
187; N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1970, at 1, col. 4. Banks have assisted new private schools with
long-term loans at favorable rates, Desegregation: The South's Tense Truce, TIMr, Sept.
14, 1970, at 40; Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, liss.), Nov. 13, 1970, at 1, col. 5.
Some labor unions have assisted the establishment of private schools for their mem-
bers' children, B. MusE, supra note 13, at 158, and unionized workers have demanded
and received bonuses from employers to pay private school tuition. Interview with
Noel B. Cumbaa, Vice President, Greenville Bank, in Greenville, MLssissippi, March
26, 1971.
68. Interview with Elmo Bradley, CPA, in Greenville, Mississippi, March 26, 1971.
See 1971 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 76. One major Southern Protestant denomi-
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The segregation academies have recently joined in both state and
Southern associations. The Southern Independent School Association,
which is affiliated with the segregationist Citizens Councils, 0 repre-
sents 396 academies with a combined enrollment of 176,000.70 State
associations centralize the political influence of the academies, 71 pro-
nation has, however, expressly disavowed connection with these Christian Academics,
Mondale Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 3D, at 1950.
The numbers of students and schools involved in two Southern states are as follows:
Miss.: 1972-73 N. Car. 1972-73
Baptist 3,525t 10t- 10,012t 41"ff
Catholic 12,529 50 10,093 41
Sectarian Episcopal 1,820 9 1,267 5
Lutheran ................ 746 7
Presbyterian 1,198 6 575 5
Seventh-Day Adventist 145 2 998 18
Other 405 6 1,896 14
Total 19.622 83 25,587 131
Nonsectarian* 42,744 116 24,577 111
Grand Total 62,366 199 50,164 242
t Enrollment
"- Number of schools* Includes 7 Mississippi schools with a total enrollment of 2,473, and 21 North
Carolina schools with a total enrollment of 4,488 which, although unaffiliated, de-
nominate themselves Christian Academies.
Sources: NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF PUBLIC INsTRUcTION, DIRECTORY OF APPROVED NoN-
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1972-73 (1973); R. THOiPsoN,, NoN-PUBLIC SCHOOLS 1972-73 (Miss. State
Dep't of Education 1973).
69. Organized in 1954 in response to Brown, the Citizens Councils were a powerful
force in massive resistance. After a decline in the 1960's, the Councils have enjoyed a
recent resurgence as the promoters of segregation academies. See 1972 SRC Report, supra
note 40, at 54; 1971 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 76; Minor, Mississippi's Citizens
Council Segregation Academies, Times-Picayune (New Orleans), May 17, 1970, reprinted
in Mondale Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 3D, at 2198-2200; Clarion-Ledger (Jackson,
Miss.), Sept. 4, 1972, at 1lA, col. 1.
70. 1972 SRC Report 54. The state organizations affiliated with SISA, according to the
official journal of the Citizens Councils are:
Enrollment Schools
Alabama Private School Ass'n: 22,000 65
Georgia (no statewide organization): 20,000 56
Louisiana Independent School Ass'n: 23,000 50
Mississippi Private School Ass'n: 50,000 92
North Carolina Private School Ass'n: 5,000 15
South Carolina Independent School Ass'n: 50,000 70
Virginia Independent Schools Ass'n: 11,000 47
Source: Southern Independent School Association Represents 176,000, Tin; CtrlztN,
Dec. 1971, at 17, 18, 29.
71. The dual objectives of the private school lobby are to obtain state assistance and
tax relief for private schools, while holding public school taxes and expenditures to a
minimum. See Pittman, Private School Lobby is Forming, Delta Democrat.Times (Green-
ville, Miss.), Oct. 16, 1970, at 4, col. 5; Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Miss,), Jail.
26, 1973, at 6, col. 1 (private school lobby instrumental in defeating proposal for public
kindergarten system in Mississippi); MAJORITY BLACK SCHOOL DISTRIrs, supra note 16,
at 8 (private schools lobby for educational television).
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mote interscholastic athletic competition,72 and serve as official ac-
crediting agencies.
73
The quality of instruction, staff, and physical facilities among the
academies varies greatly. Quality generally increases with the size of
the student body, the age of the school, and the amount of tuition
charged.74 However, many academies fail to achieve even minimal
standards of educational quality.7 5 Few are accredited by the regional
associations of colleges and schools.70 Many are permitted to operate
despite the fact that they do not meet even the lower requirements of
state compulsory attendance laws.
77
72. Schools lacking a first-rate athletic program are unattractive both to star ath-
letes hoping for college scholarships and to ordinary students seeking an institution
with a complete extracurricular program. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 473
F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973). Since segregation academies as a matter of principle do not
compete against desegregated public school teams, academy conferences have been or-
ganized to promote segregated competition. MALjomyr BLtc,, SCHOOL DiSICrs 8;
Walden & Cleveland, supra note 66, at 238-39.
73. The South Carolina Independent Schools Association (SCISA) is recognized by"
the state as a private school accrediting agency, S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 21-757, 21-757.2
(Supp. 1971). Private schools can still be accredited by the State Board of Education,
but in practice most are accredited by SCISA. Questionnaire from South Carolina,
supra note 45, at answer 4. For more information on SCISA, see 1972 SRC Report,
supra note 40, at 54; 1971 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 75-77; Cleghorn, The Old
South Tries Again-Segregation Academies, SATURDAY REviE;, May 16, 1970, reprinted in
Mondale Hearings, supra note 40, pt. 3D, at 1963, 1967.
74. Cleveland, supra note 57, at 13941.
75. A committee of the Georgia State Senate reported that in 1971 better than half
the private schools in the state lacked "adequate facilities, library volumes, teaching aids,
staff personnel, certified teaching staff, lunchroom facilities and [do not] ... comply
with safety and health standards." GEORGIA STATE SENATE PRIVATE ScHOOL STUDY COMM.,
REPORT 2 (1971). A study of segregation academies in Alabama found that "two-thirds
of the academies currently [1971] employ one or more teachers who do not qualify
for teaching certificates. Half of the schools have one or more teachers with less than
the baccalaureate degree. More than two-thirds of the schools assign one or more
teachers to fields of instruction other than those for which they were minimally
prepared." Walden & Cleveland, supra note 66, at 238. The stud, also found gross in-
adequacies in audio-visual equipment, science laboratory equipment, instructional ma-
terials, and student counseling services at many of the schools. Id.
76. For example, only 13 of 263 non-public schools (4.9 percent) operating in North
Carolina in 1972-73 were accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools,
and only 19 (7.2 percent) were accredited by the State Department of Public Instruction.
NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF PUBLIC INsTRUcTION, DIRECTORY OF APPROVED NoN-PUuc
SCHOoLs 1972-73 (1973). In 1971-72, 35 of 453 non-public schools in Louisiana were
regionally accredited. Private Schools, ScHoors IN TRANsrrio., Aug. 1972, at 6. Cleve-
land's study of 25 Alabama academies showed that 5 (20 percent) were regionally ac-
credited and 10 (40 percent) met state accreditation standards. Cleveland, supra note
57, at 66.
77. Of 174 North Carolina nonpublic schools in 1968-69, see note 45 supra, 62, or 35.6
percent, failed to meet low minimum standards to qualify as a school under state com-
pulsory attendance laws. Myles, supra note 59, at 5. In 1972-73, of the 263 schools
reporting to state authorities, see NORTH CAROLINA DEPT or Punac INsmcrIoN, List OF
Am NoN-PuBLc ScHooLs IN NORTH CAROLINA 1972-73 (1973), 242 met the standards,
NORTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF PuBLIc INSTRUCrTON, supra note 76. Thus, 21, or 8.0 percent
still failed.
In 1971-72, only 148 of 453 nonpublic schools in Louisiana were approved under
state accreditation standards. Private Schools, supra note 76, at 6.
In Alabama, 89 percent of the school superintendents for school districts in which
private schools existed during the 1969-70 school year reported that one or more
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New academies have generally attempted to improve the quality of
their academic program, 5 primarily by persuading experienced public
school personnel to switch to the private schools."0 However, in terms
of the quality of instruction and facilities offered, most academies
still remain inferior to both the white public schools which existed
prior to desegregation and the presently desegregated public schools
from which the whites have fled.8 0 It is therefore clear that the raison
d'etre of the true segregation academy is racial separation, not edu-
cational excellence.
C. Impact on the Public School System
The availability of segregated private schools facilitates the with-
drawal of both students and financial support from the public school
private schools in their districts failed to comply with minimum standards estab.
,shed by compulsory attendance law. Cleveland, supra note 57, at 68.
For an illustration of a failure to enforce attendance laws as part of a broader pattern
of assistance to private schools, see Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Coini'n,
275 F. Supp. 833, 849-50 (E.D. La. 1967). See also 1972 SRC Report, supra note 40, at
57; Myles, supra note 59, at 5. As a result of its repeal during massive resistance, Mis-
sissippi has had no compulsory attendance law since the mid-1950's. Delta Democrat-
Times (Greenville, Miss.), Jan. 9, 1973, at 5, col. 1.
78. They have apparently had some success. See, e.g., North Carolina statistics, notes
76-77 supra. From the first, the new academies have professed to offer a "better quality"
education than public schools because of their racial composition, strict discipline,
substantial parental control, and conservative ideology. Undoubtedly these factors of
personal preference outweigh academic deficiencies and economic burdens in the minds
of many white parents. See 1969 SRC Report, supra note 40, at 1951; White Citizens
Councils, Welcome to Council School, reprinted in Mondale Hearings, supra note 40,
pt. 3D, at 2201-06.
79. In Louisiana, between 1962 and 1967, 35 percent of the teachers in segregation
academies came from the public schools. Poindexter v. Louisiana Fin. Assistance Comm'n,
275 F. Supp. 833, 851 (E.D. La. 1967).
In areas in which the public schools have been almost completely resegrega ted, white
teacher switchover has apparently been significant. Mondale Hearings, pt. A, at 1018.
See Brief of Appellant at 4, 18, Norwood v. Harrison, No. 72-77 (U.S., docketed July
14, 1972); Motion for Additional Relief at 9-10, McFerren v. County Bd. of Educ., Civil
No. C-65-136 (W.D. Tenn., filed Aug. 31, 1971).
Teachers leave public school even though transfer to private school can mean fi.
nancial sacrifice. Myles, supra note 59, at 5. To reduce that sacrifice, state and local
governments have occasionally assisted segregation academies by providing continued
financial benefits for former public school teachers who have joined the academies.
Mississippi school districts have, for example, with the approval of the state Attorney
General, paid the salaries of white teachers who resigned to teach at academies. This
tactic was enjoined and restitution ordered in United States v. Tunica County School
Dist., 440 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971). Georgia, Louisiana, and Virginia private school teachers
are permitted to participate in state teacher retirement programs. GA. CODE § 32-.2931
(1969); LA. REV. STAT. § 17:600(H) (West Supp. 1973); VA. CODE § 51.111.38:1 (1969). Virginia
also pays a contribution into the retirement fund for the benefit of private school
teachers. Id. § 55.111.38:3.
80. Despite widespread white fears, academic standards in desegregated public schools
have not declined to the level long associated with all-black schools. In Greenville,
Mississippi, for example, 1971 average achievement test scores of eleventh grade students
in the public system showed an increase over 1969 scores, despite the implementation
of a unitary school system and the simultaneous withdrawal of over one-third of the
white students. Delta Democrat-Times (Greenville, Miss.), May 7, 1972, at 4, col. 1;
id. May 8, 1972, at I, col. 1.
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system. The number of whites fleeing to private schools appears to
be closely correlated with the percentage of blacks enrolled in the local
public schools."' In many heavily black districts, virtually all the
whites have left. 2 In districts with fewer black students transfers have
81. In a study of segregation academies in Alabama, it was found that in school
districts with a 51-75 percent black students, an average of 21 percent of white students
left to attend private schools, while in school districts with 75 percent or more black
students, 53.5 percent of white students left public schools. Walden & Cleveland. supra
note 66, at 234. The 56 majority black school districts in Mississippi lost 40 percent
of their white students between 1968 and 1971. Calculated from Deposition of Lloyd
Henderson, Director, Education Division, Office of Civil Rights, at 1-4, Plaintiff's Ex.
10, Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss.), prob. furis. noted, 409 U.S.
839 (1972).
82. As early as 1967, the United States Civil Rights Commission reported virtually
complete white flight to segregation academies in a number of majority black school
districts. 1967 CRC REPORT, supra note 1, at 7679. Included in this phenomenon are
two school districts which were parties to the 1954 Brown decision. In Prince Edward
County, Virginia, the public schools enrolled, in 1971-72, 1900 blacks and 150 whites;
Prince Edward Academy enrolled the remaining 1318 whites. LDF REPORr, supra note
42, at 36-37. In May 1972 Clarendon County School Dist. No. 1 (S.C.) enrolled 2195
blacks and 5 whites; 411 whites attended Clarendon Hall Academy. Id. at 31-32.
The implementation of unitary school plans after 1969 resulted in similar white
withdrawals in Mississippi's heavily black districts:
Fall 19691 Feb.1970 1  Fall 19702 Fall 19723
District TV.- B.t IV. B. TV. B. TV. B.
Canton Munic. 1,314 3,746 36 3,717 73 3,770 186 3,746
Hollandale Munic.' 155 2,000 0 N/A 12 2.000 22 1,942
Holmes County2  904 5,657ift 0 N/A 18 5,110 8 5,071
Indianola Munic. 991 2,799 0 2,757 219 2,896 304 3,077
Tunica County 428 3,039 0 N/A 7 2,993 81 2,836
Wilkinson County 766 2,709 0 2,693 4 2,642 52 2,471
* White public school enrollment
t Black public school enrollment
"t Fall, 1968
2 These columns are, unless otherwise indicated, taken from the depositions of the
superintendents of schools of the various districts named, all filed in Coffey v. State
Educ. Fin. Comm'n, Civil No. 3906 (S.D. Miss., filed March 17. 1970); Deposition of
D. B. Floyd, Superintendent of Indianola Munic. School Dist., at 5-6; Deposition of
L. Fortenberry, Superintendent of Canton Munic. School DisL, at 4-5; Deposition of
G. Pettey, Superintendent of Tunica County School Dist., at 5-7; Deposition of B. Waites.
Superintendent of Wilkinson County School Dist., at 5-6.
- Fall 1970 and all Holmes County statistics are compiled from data in Deposition
of Lloyd Henderson, Director, Education Division, Office of Civil Rights, at 1-4, Plain-
tiff's Ex. 10, Norwood v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss.), prob. juris. noted,
409 U.S. 839 (1972).
3 In this column, statistics for Canton Municipal, Holmes County. and Wilkinson
County School Districts are taken from the Fall 1972, Compliance Reports at 1, filed
by each of those districts in United States v. Hinds County School B3d.. Nos. 28030,
28042 (5th Cir., filed Dec. 1972); statistics for Indianola Municipal School District are
taken from Fall 1972, Compliance Report, at 1, United States v. Indianola Separate
Municipal School Dist., Civil No. GC-6637-K (N.D. Miss., filed March 1973); statistics
for Tunica County are taken from Fall 1972, Compliance Report, at 1, United States
v. Tunica County School Dist., Civil No. DC-6718-K (N.D. Miss., filed March 1973);
statistics for Hollandale Municipal are taken from Fall 1972, Compliance Report. at I.
United States v. Hollandale Munic. School Dist., Civil No. GC-6922-S (N.D. Miss., filed
Sept. 1972).
' Hollandale statistics for 1969 and Feb. 1970 are from MAjoarm BLAce Sc11oL
DLRIcrs, supra note 16, at 24.
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been less dramatic. Nevertheless, the transfer rate is often sufficient
to produce a significant change in the district's racial composition. s
Often the withdrawals have resulted in a failure to eliminate all-black
public schools.8 4 Achieving desegregation where the white student
population has thus been depleted requires increasingly drastic means,
notably more busing. Such measures are predictably self-defeating,
since they in turn accelerate the exodus of white pupils. sY
A second effect of this white withdrawal is the undermining of fi-
nancial support for the public schools. Decreased enrollment results
in an automatic reduction of state funds for local systems.8 0 More-
over, state legislatures and local school boards have also often reduced
83. Three school districts illustrate the impact of student withdrawal on public
school desegregation plans in contexts which are, respectively, rural, urban, and metro.
politan.
Pointe Coupee, a rural parish in central Louisiana, instituted a school pairing plan
in 1969-70. Within one year the white enrollment in parish schools decreased by more
than 70 percent; the concentration of black students increased from 60 to 85 percent.
Although the school board made modifications in the pairing plan, persuading some
white students to return, parish schools are still 70 percent black. Brief for Appellees
at 2-4, Boyd v. Point Coupee Parish School Bd., No. 71-3305 (5th Cir., filed Oct. 19, 1971).
In Jackson, Mississippi, white student enrollment in September 1970 was 42 percent
below that of a year earlier, following a January 1970 order to convert to a unitary
system. As a result of white flight, eight public schools remain more than 90 percent
black and seventeen are more than 75 percent black. Compliance Reports, Singleton v.
Jackson Munic. Separate School Dist., Civil No. 3379 (S.D. Miss. 1971); Brief for Ap-
pellant at 16-17, Norwood v. Harrison, No. 72-77 (U.S., docketed July 14, 1972).
By February 1973, Memphis, Tennessee, the nation's tenth largest school district, had
lost nearly a quarter of its 1971-72 white enrollment of 67,500. The major triggering
event was the January 1973 implementation of a desegregation plan requiring inten.
sive busing of over 13,000 students. A substantial proportion of these pupils have el-
rolled in existing private schools or in eighteen new academies established by the
Citizens Against Bussing. See Northcross v. Memphis Bd. of Educ., 341 F. Supp. 583, 586
(W.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 466 F.2d 890, 892-93 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3445
(Feb. 20, 1973); Commercial Appeal (Memphis, Tenn.), Jan. 7, 1973, at 31A, col. 3; id.,
Feb. 18, 1973, § 6, at 2, col. 3.
84. The experience of Jackson, Mississippi, is illustrative. See note 83 supra.
85. See Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 464 (1972); Boyd
v. Pointe Coupee Parish School Bd., 332 F. Supp. 994 (E.D. La. 1971), appeal docketed,
No. 71-3305, 5th Cir., Nov. 17, 1971.
86. In most southern states, state aid to local school districts is based on attendance.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 207(2) (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. ch. 32-6 (1969); MIsS,
CODE ANN. §§ 6248-01 to 6248-26 (Supp. 1972). Although reductions in state funding
are based on declining enrollment, a school system cannot reduce expenditures in direct
proportion to lower enrollment since overhead costs established on the basis of the
higher attendance cannot be immediately reduced. Buie, supra note 57, at 128-30; Inter-
view with W. B. Thompson, Greenville Superintendent of Schools, in Greenville, Mis-
sissippi, March 26, 1971.
Emergency School Assistance Funds, Pub. L. No. 91-380, 84 Stat. 800, provide limited
federal grants to improve the quality of recently desegregated schools. These funds,
however, cannot be used to replace funding from other sources which have been re-
duced as a result of desegregation. 45 C.F.R. § 181.6 (1972). These funds also cannot
be given to school districts which have engaged in transfers of public school property
to private schools. 84 Stat. 800; 45 C.F.R. § 181.3(a)(4) (1972). A survey of 295 school
districts in the South indicated that 52 have engaged in such transfers. Amar.tCAN
FRIENDS SERVICE CoMM., THE EM.ERGENCY SCHOOL ASSISTANCE Acr: AN EVALUATION 40,
57, 99-100 (1970). ESAP funds have been terminated in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, Isle
of Wight County, Virginia, and Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina. See Record at
I App. 44, School Bd. v. Department of HEW, No. 72-315 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 1973).
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discretionary educational appropriations.8 7 Similarly, local electorates
have increasingly refused to approve new bond issues, and issues ap-
proved before desegregation have not been funded.88
Nonmonetary resources have also been diverted from the public
schools. Transfers of school buildings and equipment to the private
academies have affected operations in some districts.80 Transfers of
experienced teachers and administrators have also occurred in virtually
every district where academies are active °0 This in turn accelerates
withdrawals, since white parents are often reluctant to enroll their
children in classes taught by blacks.91
It is thus evident that the segregation academies are a key element
in a new dual system of schools-one, white and "private"; the other,
disproportionately black and "public." The academies clearly threaten
to frustrate the national goal of banishing racial segregation from the
classroom.
III. Segregation Academies and State Action
Before the courts can move directly against the segregation acade-
mies, they must find the Fourteenth Amendment applicable to those
privately organized and operated schools. However, since the early
Civil Rights Cases,92 it has been settled that the Fourteenth Amend-
87. Typical reductions of school taxes and expenditures in local districts are dis-
cussed note 60 supra. Reduced expenditures for public education have been most evident
in predominantly black public school systems which remain in the control of white
school boards. See, e.g., Complaint at 34, Nelson v. Sumter County Bd. of Edu., Civil
No. 730 (M.D. Ga., filed April 22, 1971). Reductions of state aid to public schools have
not been evident probably because private school forces are not as concentrated at the
state level as they are in some local school districts. However, proposed increases in
state appropriations for education, particularly for teachers' salaries, have been resisted
and curtailed by private school lobbies. See fAJORrr BLACK SCHOOL Dzs-rucrs, supra
note 16, at 6-8.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 433 F-0d 605. 609 (5th Cir.
1970); Franklin v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 288 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Miss. 1968);
MAJORIy BLACK SCHOOL DIsRmcTs 8.
89. See note 63 supra. However, at least some of the buildings transferred had be-
come obsolete or surplus due to school consolidation prior to desegregation. See
McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Mississippi, Civil No. 4706 (S.D. Miss. May 3, 1972), remanded, No. 72-2521 (5th Cir. Apr.11, 1973).
90. See note 79 supra.
91. Faculty resignations in Pointe Coupee Parish, Louisiana. are representative of
those in many districts. Prior to the 1969-70 school pairing plan, the Parish employed
147 black and 120 white teachers. 1h that year fifty-three white teachers resigned. Al-
though its -desegregation plan required faculties to be distributed among schools on
a racially balanced basis, see Singleton v. Jackson Munic. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d
1211, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1032 (1970), the faculties at three
historically black schools following the white resignations consisted of seven whites and
sixty-seven blacks, while faculties at three formerly white schools were composed of
thirty-nine whites and twenty-two blacks. Brief of Appellee at 2, Boyd v. Pointe Coupee
Parish School Bd., No. 71-3305 (5th Cir., filed Oct. 29. 1971). See also note 83 supra.
92. 109 US. 3 (1883). See also United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 5L2 (1875).
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ment applies only to actions of the "state" and not to actions which
are "private." 93 At one extreme-the official actions of all state and
local governing agencies-there is no doubt that the Amendment ap-
plies.94 At the other extreme, there are actions which are undeniably
those of private individuals. 5
However, between these two clear cases 0 there are a multitude of
situations in which the state is somehow involved in the activity of
a private group" or in which a private group exercises what might
be ralled governmental authority. 8 Generally, the Supreme Court has
held that the distinction between individual and state action depends
on whether the state has become "substantially involved"00 in a nomi-
nally private discrimination. The content of "substantially involved"
shifts from situation to situation, but basically the phrase invokes an
ad hoc balancing of the effect of the discrimination on one side, and
the freedoms of association and privacy on the other.100
In the case of segregation academies there is, as discussed above,
evidence of state or local involvement both in the provision of equip-
ment, buildings, and teachers, and in the state's failure to protect the
public schools from the impact of the private academies. Whether the
academies in a particular community are state action thus involves
both a consideration of such involvement and an ad hoc balancing of
the associational interests inherent in private education and the effect
of the discrimination.
But despite the Court's willingness to express state action tests in
terms of substantial state involvement, other decisions suggest that
the opponents of the segregation academies would be well advised to
convince the Court that the state action involved satisfies an even
more demanding definition. This is the proposition that it is im-
93. The literature on the question of state action is enormous. See, e.g., Black,
Foreword: State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 1-IAnv. L.
REv. 69 (1967); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L.
REv. 473 (1962); Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NomrE DAME LAW. 303
(1959); Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 855 (1966).
94. See Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955).
95. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Adickes v. S. H. Kress
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
96. These two clear cases are posited by Justice Harlan in Adickes v. S. H-. Kress
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169 (1970).
97. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilming.
ton Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
98. See, e.g., Evans v. Newton, 382 US. 296 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
99. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Reitman v. Mulkey, 889
U.S. 369 (1967); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
100. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), with Reitman v.
Mulkey, 389 U.S. 369 (1967).
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permissible for the state to avoid the constitutional standards applied
to its functions by permitting those duties to be assumed by nominally
private groups. Thus, in Terry v. Adams the Court held a private
political club to Fifteenth Amendment standards after finding that
it had effectively controlled Democratic party primaries in Texas since
1890. The state had been ordered to desegregate the official primary,
02
and the Court found that the club had "produce[d] the equivalent of
the prohibited [official Democratic primary] election."
10 3
A similar principle was employed in the more recent case of Evans
v. Newton?0 4 There the Court found "state action" where a city had
operated a park under the terms of a will mandating racial segregation,
even after the city had resigned in favor of private trustees. 0° This
principle that a state or local governing agency may not avoid the con-
stitutional requirements attached to its functions by yielding them to
a nominally private group finds further support in other "state action"
holdings.'0
6
This approach seems persuasive in the case of segregation academies.
Ostensibly private groups which assume from the state the function
of providing education take that function with its constitutional bur-
den: They too must provide education on a desegregated basis. In-
deed, the Supreme Court intimated as much when it held that the
closing of public schools in order to avoid desegregation and the con-
comitant establishment of segregated private schools was state action
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0
7
101. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
102. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
103. 345 US. at 469.
104. 382 U.S. 296 (1966). See also Pennsylvania Y. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968); Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (Sth
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 US. 111 (1963).
105. It appears from Justice Douglas' opinion that the city resigned when suit was
brought in state court to remove it as trustee because the city had begun to admit
blacks to the park. See 382 U.S. at 297-98. The state court accepted the city's rMigna-
tion and appointed three private trustees.
Later the Court allowed the Georgia courts to permit the park to revert to the
donor's heirs. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
106. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 587 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1967) (state constitutional amend-
ment that displaces state fair housing laws is state action violative of Fourteenth Amend-
ment; Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 724-26 (1961) (state
agency leases part of public building to private restaurant which discriminates on the
basis of race; held: lessee must recognize Fourteenth Amendment commands "as though
they were binding covenants written into the agreement itself"). See aso Local 590,
Amalgamated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 303 (1968): Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v.
Street, 567 U.S. 740 (1961); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Steele v. Louisville
& N. R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Lavoi v. Bigwood, 457 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1972).
107. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 US. 218, 232 (1964). The Court noted
that the racial objective of the school closing was its constitutional defect: "Whatever
non-racial grounds might support a State's allowing a county to abandon public schools.
the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to de-
segregation do not qualify as constitutional." Id. at 231.
1455
The Yale Law Journal
The difficulty with this principle is thus not conceptual, but rather
evidentiary. As indicated by language commonly used in the cases,
the Court is very sensitive to the problem of proof in state action liti-
gation. Thus, a finding of state action requires "sifting facts and weigh-
ing circumstances."' s It is therefore necessary to define those facts
which are probative of either the delegation to or assumption by pri-
vate groups of the former state function of providing segregated
education.
IV. Toward Judicial Action Against Segregation Academies
A. The Indicia of State Action
The first element in a finding that segregation academies represent
state action is the preexistence of a dual system of public schools.100
The second factor is some event, normally a desegregation order, which
makes it difficult or impossible to maintain this discriminatory system.
If, after this event, a system of white private schools is created to re-
place "white" public schools, that system is the product of state action,
and corrective judicial action is appropriate. The act of replacement
involves private groups assuming a function formerly exercised by the
state at the time the state is under a constitutional command in regard
to that function.
In looking for such a replacement, the threshold inquiry is whether
there are substantial increases in white private school enrollment fol-
lowing public school desegregation. In this initial determination, the
growth of private school enrollment would be compared with the rate
of growth preceding the desegregation order. A noticeable acceleration
correlated with a disproportionately white withdrawal would alert a
court to the possibility that private schools were being used to circum-
vent the duty to desegregate. 110 It would then be necessary to deter-
mine whether the increase in private school enrollment were prop-
erly characterized as state or private action. The experience of the
108. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
109. This element would also exist in the North should it be held that racial balance
and metropolitan consolidation are required to eliminate the de facto segregation of
Northern school districts. See Adams v. Richardson, 41 U.S.L.W. 2452 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 1973).
110. Even if an explanation other than a community desire to avoid desegrcgation
could be shown to account for the coincidence of the desegregation order and the trans-
fers from public to private schools, if the effect is that private groups have assumed
the government's educational function, the schools are subject to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment command represented by the desegregation order. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S.
369 (1967); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461, 466 (1953). See p. 1455 supra.
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South is useful in suggesting the characteristics of a rapid shift from
publicly to privately segregated education. Because these factors, which
determine whether the academies represent state or merely private ac-
tion, appear in the flux following the judicial order, they may not be
subject to precise measurement. They should, however, be susceptible
of sufficiently accurate description to provide a basis for judicial reme-
dies.
The first of these factors is the extent of white student transfer, in
both absolute and proportional terms. Should the transfer be insignif-
icant, this would be evidence that it is merely the product of private
action. If, however, virtually all of the white students in a particular
community flee the public schools to enroll in private schools, more
than individual choice is obviously involved. Such a massive uniform
action necessarily implies that the state's educational function has been
transferred to the private schools. This fact, in itself, is virtually con-
clusive evidence that the transfer, and the private schools benefited
by it, exhibit state action."'
Between the extremes of de minimis and total withdrawal, the flight
of white students is inconclusive on the issue of state action. Other fac-
tors, such as the various supportive functions that the community pro-
vides for the education of its children, must be considered before the
private schools can be regarded as state action.
The first of these other factors is the transfer, by purchase or gift,
of public school property to segregated private schools.112 If a substan-
tial amount of equipment has been transferred, it would seem that
more than individual dereliction is involved. Either by participation
or acquiescence, the state is providing necessary support to the private
schools with equipment purchased by public funds.
The second factor is the shifting of white teachers and adininistra-
tors from public to private schools.11a Again, state rather than indi-
vidual action is evident if such transfers occur en masse, involve the
recruitment of students, or proceed more rapidly than the rate of
student withdrawal. Again, either by participation or acquiescence, the
111. Note that transfers of this magnitude will have the effect of producing a racial
composition in the public schools which is "substantially disproportionate" to that of
the school age community including the transferred students. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg lBd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1. 26 (1971). It ma, thus. be appropriate in de-
termining whether the transfer is sufficient to justify judicial intervention to deter-
mine whether it has produced a substantial racial disproportion in the public schools.
112. See note 63 supra. This factor is active primarily during the period of priate
school formation. Of the several factors to be presented, only that of private school
financing, see p. 1458 infra, is likely to remain active in a stabilized post-withdrawal
period.
113. See note 79 supra.
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state is providing private schools with a public asset-teachers and
administrators who had gained popularity, experience, and the con-
fidence of the community by their tenure in the public schools.
The third factor concerns educational funding, and has two ele-
ments: decreases in funding for public schools and the means employed
in paying for private schools. If public school funding is reduced in
an amount substantially greater than the actual decrease in the cost
of integrated public education caused by the withdrawal of the white
students, this fact is evidence of state action in shifting resources away
from the public schools." 4 Similarly, if the private schools are sup-
ported by what is in essence an informal system of taxation, 11 a public
subsidy to private education again exists. Where disproportionate de-
creases in public school financing exist in conjunction with such an
informal tax system, there is an especially strong case that there has
been a shift of financial resources for the purpose of continuing seg-
regated education-a shift which again involves the state.
The fourth factor is probably the most difficult to measure. It in-
volves community support of private, segregated education by or-
ganizations such as labor unions and social clubs. Activity by these
groups against public education and in favor of private education,
especially when encouraged by local public officials, is again evidence
of state action."i 6
Ultimately, the determination of whether the segregated private
schools within a particular community constitute state or individual
action will require that a court weigh such factors in light of its ex-
perience with the desegregation history of the community. Whether
this factual determination is easy or difficult in a given case, the legal
standards are clear: Segregated private schools to which the state's
constitutionally burdened educational function has been transferred
represent state action to continue racial segregation.'1T
114. The projected cost of integrated education as a standard for measurement Is
to be distinguished from the cost of formerly segregated education for whites. That Is
to say, the proper test for reductions in public school budgets is not the amount spent
on the education of white students in a segregated system.
115. An informal system of taxation could include such examples as assessments of
businesses, high pressure fund-raising campaigns, illegal tuition grant payments made
by state governments, see note 58 supra, and discounts allowed poorer families who
cannot afford segregation academy tuition. See note 57 supra.
116. See note 66 supra.
117. While the "state action" characterization may normally be expected to arise
from the activities of a certain group of schools, other schools, which do not participate
in the patterns of action which are factors identifying state action, are not tainted. How.
ever, this principle of nonparticipation is easier to state than to reduce to concrete
examples. Since probably all private schools in the South have benefited to some extent
from the white exodus from public schools, the test to be applied is necessarily relative.
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B. Remedies
Once it is determined that certain segregated private schools are
the product of state action, they are properly subject to desegregation
orders, just as are the public schools."18 Of course, private schools
unwilling to integrate would have the alternative of closing. If deseg-
regation of a particular academy is not speedily achieved, the court
should interpret that inaction as an election on the part of the school
to close."19
Whether the academies would be properly held subject to other
Fourteenth Amendment duties-such as the prohibition on school
prayer-would depend on the circumstances of the particular case. For
the purpose of reaching racial discrimination, courts are justified in
finding state action on facts which might not be state action for the
purpose of imposing less compelling duties. 20
In opposition to the forced desegregation of private schools, one
might argue that Supreme Court decisions enunciating the right of
parents to direct the education of their own children forbid such a
harsh remedy.' 2 However, in overturning the freedom of choice plans,
the Court by implication held that, in the area of public education,
the state cannot permit parents' racially motivated choices.'22 Since the
analysis proposed here allows the forced desegregation of academies
118. Desegregation is appropriate in view of the probability that the lesser alterna-
tive of requiring an open enrollment policy would not correct the racially identifiable
nature of the academies any more than freedom of choice plans did in the case of
public schools. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 431 (1968). Moreover for tax
reasons, many academies already have nominal open enrollment policies. See note 62
supra.
Those cases which have debated the question of open enrollment have not involved
an argument that the private schools constituted state action. See Gilmore v. City of
Montgomery, 473 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1973); cf. United States v. Mississippi. No. 72-2521
(5th Cir. Apr. 11, 1973); McNeal v. Tate County School Dist., 460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1972).
Desegregation of a private school was requested in Complaint at 2, Reed v. Pillow
Academy, Civil No. GC 70-79-K (N.D. Miss., filed Oct. 9, 1970). This action was dis-
missed at plaintiff's request on February 5, 1971. Delta Democrat.Tims (Greenville,
Miss.), Feb. 5, 1971, clipping on file with the Yale Law Journal.
119. It seems likely that segregation academies will dose rather than integrate. Cf.
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971); Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
A finding of state action also would support an award of damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1970). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt
Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945). Assessing heavy damages against segregation
academies will most likely force those academies to dose. Cf. notes 7.61 supra.
120. See Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1969); H. FRIENDLY, Tm D.Arm.oum
COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA 27-31 (1969).
121. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1922); Note, supra note 53, at 525-34.
The right of parental control of upbringing is not absolute. Private schools are subject
to reasonable state regulation. See R. C.&pna.LL, L. CUNNINGHLAM & R. McPalmx, Tim
ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF AmERICAN ScHooLs 494-97 (1965). See also Elson, State
Regulation of Nonpublic Schools, in PUac CONTROLs Froa NONPULIC SciooLs 104 (D.
Erickson ed. 1969).
122. Green v. County School Bd., 391 US. 431 (1968). See p. 1439 supra.
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only when state action has been found, this principle of the freedom
of choice decisions should control. Arguments that forced desegrega-
tion of church-affiliated academies would impair the "free exercise of
religion" are similarly without merit.
2 3
There are also other less drastic remedies, based on the broad powers
of the federal courts in implementing desegregation,1 2 4 which could
be invoked against specific conditions created by the segregation acade-
my movement in a particular community. These remedies do not re-
quire that the operation of academies be found state action in the sense
previously discussed. But even where that state action is found, the
court could, as a matter of discretion, employ these specific remedies
rather than order desegregation. They should be invoked, however,
only when there is reason to believe that they will succeed in removing
the state action taint.
The first of these lesser remedies is to enjoin direct or indirect state
support, including the transfer of public school property to segre-
gated private schools. Federal courts have already employed this rem-
edy to halt the transfer of public school property. 2 5 An order for the
restitution of the property would seem appropriate, although it does
not appear to have been employed in any cases.1
20
In order to counteract reductions in the financial support of public
education, the court could require local school officials to raise more
money for public schools, hire sufficient personnel, or provide ade-
quate equipment. The Supreme Court has already approved a similar
remedy in the context of the school closing litigation. 27 There are,
of course, obvious limits to this remedy: Courts are poorly equipped
to oversee public school budgets; and it is unlikely that school board
123. Courts have repeatedly held that religious practices inimical to the public
welfare may be regulated or prohibited. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878) (polygamy); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972 (Ky. 1942) (use of
poisonous snakes). Cf. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (prohibition of retail
sales on Sunday does not interfere with free exercise of Jewish religion).
The "right of association," see Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of
Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1 (1964), of course, cannot protect racial discrimination by those
"associations" which are found to involve state action. Cf. International Ass'n of Ma-
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
124. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971).
125. See Graves v. Walton County Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1972), McNeal
v. Tate County School Dist., 460 F.2d 568 (5th Cir. 1972); Wright v. City of Brighton,
441 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Complaint at 10, Brumfield v. Dodd, Civil No,
71-1316 (E.D. La., filed May 11, 1971) (seeking general order prohibiting any kind of
state aid to segregation academies).
126. Such an order was approved by implication when the Fifth Circuit ordered a
local school board to recover certain illegal payments to segregated private schools or
be held personally liable therefor. United States v. Tunica County School Dist., 323
F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971).
127. See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 233 (1964).
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members would be sent to jail for contempt, should the community
refuse to pay school taxes or consistently defeat bond issues.
Organized fund-raising and managerial efforts by those maintaining
private schools may also constitute a threat to the success of desegre-
gation. If so, an order to halt the interference would be appropriate.
Actions enjoinable would include fund-raising campaigns, construction
or purchase of buildings for new academies, and any activity designed
to create pressure on white parents or children to attend private
school. 128 Again, widespread resistance to desegregation probably
could not be controlled by injunction; and overuse of the injunction
could cause serious political reactions.
20
Finally, where there is discernible involvement of public officials,
actions could be brought under traditional concepts of state action to
enjoin those officials and private school supporters from conspiring to
deprive public school children of their civil rights.130 If appropriate,
damages could also be assessed.
V. Conclusion
In Brown the Court declared that racially separate schools were
"inherently unequal." Subsequently it held that communities could
not use "ingenious or ingenuous schemes" to thwart this principle.13'
Yet in some school districts today, desegregation has been largely
thwarted by the organization of a system of white private schools to
replace white public schools. Such tactics are not, however, beyond
judicial reach, and should be halted by application of the Fourteenth
Amendment to this new, but equally unconstitutional, dual system
of schools.
128. Such noninterference commands are typically coupled as a matter of course
with desegregation orders. See, e.g., United States v. Kasparo 2 RAcE REr L. REP,. 795,
801 (E.D. Tenn. 1957) (charge to jury in contempt trial of individual who violated an
order to cease interfering with desegregation efforts). See also Lee v. Macon County
Bd. of Educ., 231 F. Supp. 743, 755 (M.D. Ala. 1954).
129. Cf. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GRENE, THE L.ixOR INJUNCTION (1932).
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970). Actions under these statutes require a showing
of state action. Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651 (1951). Criminal indictments are also possible under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242
(1970); they again require a showing of state action. Williams v. United States, 341
U.S. 97 (1951). This showing can be made by proving that state officials were involved
in the conspiracy. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., supra; United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
131. Cooper v. Aaron, 858 U.S. 1, 17 (1958), citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
12 (1940).
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